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F. NII BOTCHWAY"

Land Ownership and Responsibility
for the Mining Environment in Ghana
ABSTRACT
The basis for a private questioning of the environmental consequences of mining is largely determined by a proprietaryinterest
in the area affected by mining. In Ghana, that proprietorshipis
uncertainand in some instances unknown. This makes individual
or private enforcement of environmentalprinciplesand regulations
by court action tenuous. This articleargues that the tedious medley
of custom, colonial and post-colonial legislation has, if anything,
worsened the uncertaintysurroundingthe ownership of mining
land in Ghana. In the midst of that doud, there is a discernible line
for state expropriationof land neededfor mining activities.
INTRODUCTION
In the earliest stages the land and its produce is shared by the
community as a whole; later the produce is the property of the
family or individualsby whose toil it is won, and the control of the
land is vested in the head of the family. When the tribal stage is
reached, the control passes to the chief, who allots unoccupiedland
at will but is not justified in dispossessingany person orfamily
who is using the land. Later still, when the pressure of population
has given the land an exchange value, the concept of proprietary
rightsemerges, and sale, mortgageand lease of land apartfrom its
user is recognized. These processes of naturalevolution, leadingup
to individualownership, may be tracedin every civilizationknown
to history.'
Though not beyond controversy, Lord Lugard's statement offers
a window into the complex terrain of land law in Africa. The hypothesized
evolutionary process of land tenure in Africa has been upset by the
consequences of the colonial enterprise. The sudden move from the purely
LLB. (Ghana), LL.M. (Dalhousie), LL.M. (Harvard), Doctoral Fellow (Manchester).
This article is based on a chapter of the author's LL.M. thesis at Dalhousie University Law
School, Canada. I am thankful to my supervisors, Professors Moira McConnell, Hugh Kindred
and Dean Russell. I also register my gratitude to Mr Kojo Bensti-Enchill for readily making
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1. This statement is attributed to a renowned British colonial administrator in Africa,
Lord Lugard. See KRISHAN MAINI, LAND LAW IN EAST ARICA 1 (1967).
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customary regulation of land use to the imposition of a colonial legal
system and the ultimate modifications following the attainment of
independence left Africa with complex land tenure systems. The unique
history of African countries also accounts for the difficulties in apportioning and/or assuming responsibility for the protection of the environment.
The picture is nowhere more conspicuous than in the regulation of land use
and the protection of the mining environment in the former British colony
of Ghana. Until independence in 1957, Ghana was called the Gold Coast,
a name descriptive of its resources and its importance to the Europeans.2
Following the formal colonization of the Gold Coast by the British in 1874,
a plethora of laws was passed by the colonial administration to regulate the
exploitation of the country's mineral resources and incidentally, land use?
These laws paid little or no attention to the environmental implications of
the mining activity. The post-colonial governments have, by and large,
followed the established colonial practice, at most superimposing new
legislation on existing practices. The confounding mix of customary,
colonial and post-colonial land regulations with regard to mining is the
subject of the discussion in this article.
In the last decade over 60 multinational and national mining
companies and other interested persons have been granted license by the
Ghana government to prospect for and mine minerals, particularly gold
Production of gold, for example, has more than quadrupled from 288,000
troy ounces in 1986 to 1.7 million troy ounces at the end of 1995? This

2. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to get to the coast of present day Ghana in
the Fifteenth Century and called the place "da mina," meaning "the mine," because of the
phenomenal amount of gold they found the people mining, using, and selling. See JOHN W.
BLAE, EUROPEAN BEGINNINGS INWEST AFRICA 1454-1578, at 10 (1937). In turn, the French, the
Dutch, the Danes, and ultimately, the British displaced the Portuguese. See J.H. Parry, The Age
of wRonnaisanoe, in APRiCA; FROM EARLY TIMES TO 1800, 210-215 (P.J. McEwan ed., 1969). See
also WILLIAM BURNErr HARVEY, LAW AND SOcIAL CHANGE INGHANA 5-7 (1966); RHODA
HOWARD, COLONIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT INGHANA, 27-31 (1978).
3. Examples include the Concessions Ordinance, Cap. 100 (1900), Rivers Ordinance,
Cap. 226 (1903), Mining Rights Regulation Ordinance, Cap. 153 (1905), and Minerals
Ordinance, Cap. 155 (1936). A number of these Ordinances are discussed in F. Nil Botchway,
Towards An Environmental Legal Regime For Gold Mining In Ghana 42-62 "(1994)
(unpublished LL.M.thesis, Dalhousie University) (on file with the Dalhousie University Law
Library).
4. See The Minerals Commission, Proceedings of the Mining Seminar (Dec. 20-23 1988)
(on file with the Minerals Commission, Accra, Ghana).
5. Memorandum from the Ghana Chamber of Mines (1997) (on fie with the author). See
also ECONOMsr INTELUGENCE UNIT, GHANA COUNTRY SURVEY (Mar. 1996); Jon Kraus, The
Economy of Stabilizationand StructuralAdjustment in Ghana, in GHANA; THE POLmCAL
Political
ECONOMY OF RECOVERY 119,122 (Donald Rothchild ed., 1991). For an historical overview of
mining policy and factors responsible for the current boom in mining activity in Ghana, see
Fui Tsikata, Ghana's Mineral Policy (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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massive boom in mining activity has brought in its wake serious questions
of environmental protection, resurrecting issues such as ownership of land
and responsibility for the mining environment. For instance, in 1993 there
was an outbreak of buruli ulcers in the Ashanti region of Ghana.6 Scientists
attribute the outbreak of the disease to unusually high acid levels in the
area's water resources, which was in turn linked to mining activities in the

region." It was, however, not determined conclusively whether large-scale
or small-scale mining was responsible for the high acid levels of the water

resources. Similar matters have arisen in the Kwabeng areas of the eastern
region, as well as the western region. These issues threaten the apparent
calm surrounding the exploitation of natural resources in Ghana, and are
of concern to investors and researchers. This work traces the historical
origins of the current environmental concerns and attempts an outline of
the ownership of land, land regulation, and its relationship to the mining
environment in Ghana.

One significant void in the maze of both colonial and post-colonial
legislation on mining is the absence of provisions relating to the right and

capacity of individuals and groups to question or challenge the environmental consequences of mining in Ghana. This article contends that though
legislation does not address the point expressly, individuals are not bereft
of legal causes of action to at least protect themselves from the hazards
posed to the environment from mining. Additionally, this article argues

that though there is a discernible case for state expropriation, that in itself
does not immunize mining interests from being legally accountable in law
for the environmental consequences of their mining activity. Some of the
common law causes of action available to individuals or groups of persons
who wish to respond to damage done to the environment by mining
include trespass to land, nuisance, the principle in Rylands v. Fletchero and

6.

See PBO1LB S DAILY GRAPHIC, Aug. 13 & 19,1993. See also Ohene Agyekum, Welcome

Address for the 1994 World Environment Day 2 (June 11, 1994)(on file with author). Mrs.
Ruby Asmah of the Institute of Aquatic Biology, Ghana, confirmed the outbreak of buruli

ulcers. (Interview by author with Ruby Asmah, Ghana Institute of Aquatic Biology, Accra,
Ghana, in Halifax, Canada [Aug 1994]).

7. See P OPLS DAILY GRAPHI:, July 8,1993, at 14; Kwabena Mate, Environmental Impact
of Mining in Ghana: Issues and Ansawers, in NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM (Feb. 1992). See also
Amowi Sutherland, The Development of Environmental Law: The Extent of Ghana's
Response to a National and International Demand (1978) (unpublished dissertation,

University of Ghana) (on file with the University of Ghana Law Library); Christine AmoakoNuamah, Minister for Environment, Opening Address at African Mining Seminar (July 10,
1996)(on file with author).
8.

In Rylands, the defendants built a water reservoir over an abandoned mine, which

collapsed under the weight of the reservoir. A nearby coal mine was flooded as a result. There
was no cause of action in either nuisance or negligence. The English House of Lords therefore
devised a new rule thus,
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negligence. To initiate an action, the party in question must have standing
in law. Historically, standing has been grounded on ownership and/or
possession of land, especially in the common law of tort.' To this end, this
article focuses on the discussion of land ownership as a foundation for an
individual's or groups' cause of action to enforce responsibility for the
mining environment.
The discussion is divided into three parts. The first part examines
the customary law principles of land ownership in Ghana and the incidents
that go with it An understanding of these matters is necessary in order to
determine who has rights over land in Ghana, who can grant land for
mining purposes, and how the mining environment could be protected
under such arrangements. The second part looks at the concessions regime
and its impact on the environment, while the third section focuses on the
legislative arrangements for acquiring land for mining purposes, which
has, to a large extent, superseded the customary law system. Throughout
this article, the questions being pursued include who has the right in law
to question damage done to the environment by mining activity, and which
body or person can be held accountable for any such damage?
CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEM
Prior to colonial rule Ghana had varying, though not entirely
dissimilar, land tenure schemes. For example, land was largely communally owned and a member of the land owning community had an inherent
right to reduce to his or her occupation any part of previously unoccupied
communal land."0 Land tenure in present day Ghana is still largely based
the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
own peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima fade answerable for all the
damage which is the natural consequences of its escape.
[1861-73 All E.R. 1, 7 (Al England Law Reports) For the development of this principle, see
TONY WEm, A CAsEBooK ON TORT 459-80 (1996).
9. Lord Simonds reasoned in the case of Read v. Lyons, 119471 A.C. 156,183 (Appeals
Cases) (Eng.) that "he alone has a lawful claim who has suffered an invasion of some
proprietary or other interests in land." The interest in land requirement as a basis for action
has now been modified by the English Court of Appeals in the case of Khorasandjianv. Bush,
[1993]3 Al E.R. 669 (All England Law Reports). In certain circumstances such as harassment,
it is sufficient if a family member is seized of a proprietary interest. For a discussion of tort
law as a means of environmental protection see F. Nil Botchway, supra note 3, at 140-45,180202.
10. See Nerquaye Tetteh v. Maim, [1959) G.LR. 368 (Ghana Law Reports); Oblee v.
Armah, [19581 3 W.A.LR. 484 (West African Law Reports) (Ghana). In both cases the court
confirmed the inherent and inalienable right of a member of the land owning community to
reduce to his or her occupation and use any portion of the community land which is hitherto
unencumbered. It is important, however, to acknowledge the overlordship of the chief.
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on the customary law. However, serious inroads have been made into the
customary land tenure system resulting mainly from the changing nature
of the country's agricultural and mining economy. The introduction of cash
crops like cocoa and coffee and the long gestation of European mining
interests introduced a certain level of permanency, hitherto limited or at
best transitory, into the customary land owning scheme.1 The advent of
colonial rule included the introduction of the British legal system and land
tenure terminology into the colony. This marked the genesis of the
changing conceptualization and interpretation of customary land tenure in
Ghana. 2 These alterations in the customary land tenure system have been
exacerbated by the legislation passed on land ownership and use, by both
colonial and post-colonial legislatures. The problems caused by the
resulting, somewhat confused, system of land tenure and its relationship
to the mining environment are the topic of discussion in this section of the
article.
The customary law concepts of land ownership are the subject of
debate among scholars of the law and sociology.' Some argue that African
peoples do not, traditionally, have the conception of ownership of land as
it is in the European sense.'4 To them, land belongs to God and its use is
granted to the people who occupy the land for the time being. 5 The
exclusiveness of right which ownership is supposed to entail to Europeans
was not apparent in many African societies. In general, customary law
forbade the user to exercise rights in a manner that was detrimental to the
interests of the community. "6' This meant that any piece of land granted

11. See DAViD KIMBLE, APOLIICALHISoRY OF GHANA 36 (1963). See also S.K.B. ASANTE,
PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL GOALS IN GHANA 1844-1966 (1975). Legal and economic historians

have disagreed over certain aspects of the customary land regime such as sale of land, but are
almost unanimous on the changes introduced or hastened by the colonial economy. See

ALLAN MCPHEE, THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTnoN INWesT AmRICA 130 (1926).
12. See B.O. NWABUEZE, NIGERIAN LAND LAW 84-87,106-40 (1972); Golightly v. Ashrifie,
[1955] W.A.C.A. 676 (West African Court of Appeals Reports) (Ghana); W.C. EKOW DANIELS,

THE COMMON LAw INWEsr AFRIA 377-78 (1964).
13.

See MCPHEE, supra note 11.

14. "As a rule, in the various systems of native jurisprudence throughout the Empire,
there is no such full division between property and possession as English lawyers are familiar
with." Amodu Tijani v. Secretary to the Government of Southern Nigeria, [192112 A.C. 399,
403 (Appeals Cases) (Eng.).
15. See FRANK M. MiSuD, CUSTOMARY LAND LAw INAFRIcA 41-42 (1967). See also the
judgement of Lord Denning in Oyekana v. Adele, [1957] 2 All E.R. 785,789-90 (All England
Law Reports).
16. The community includes not only the living but also those yet unborn, as well as the

spirits of the departed. DAVID KIMLE, supra note 11, at 17; Gerald Antoine, The Aboriginal
Conceptof Imd: Deh Cho Land and Resource Governance,in DISPOSrION OF NATURAL RESOURCES:

OpToNs AND ISSUES FOR NORTHERN LANDS 47 (Monique Ross & Owen Saunders eds., 1997).
Some European historians described this feature as "backward," "crude," "fetish," etc. See
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under customary law for mining purposes could not be used in ways that
were pernicious to the interests of the people of the community. It also
meant that the person who, for the time being, occupied the land for
mining purposes, could not prevent other members of the community from
enjoying benefits such as rights of way, hunting, grazing, watering of
animals, collection of firewood, sticks, grass, et cetera.17
The first major point of contention regarding the customary legal
conception of land ownership in Ghana, however, is whether there are
ownerless lands in the country. There are two main positions on the issue.
One is that propounded by Nii Amaa Ollenu, that the first principle in
customary land law is that there is no land without an owner. "Every inch
of land and every square inch of land is vested in somebody.""8 Various
colonial administrators and anthropologists also recognized this position
of the customary land tenure system. In a dispatch to then Colonial
Secretary Camavon in 1877, Sir Freeling stated that "there is no land
absolutely unoccupied in the sense of being without an owner; it is either
the property of the occupant of the stool or of certain chiefs and
headmen."19 Some researchers have disputed this view of the customary
land law. Kludze contends that the principle that there are no ownerless
lands in Ghana is "judicial customary law" and not the customary law

generally, MCPHEE, supra note 11, at 130,134,130-60. Yet, the principle of ownership by the
living, the unborn and the departed, or trusteeship for all, represents the essence of the
sustainable development philosophy which is now almost elevated to international customary
law status. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON

FUURE 8 (1987), and the entire text. See also, Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),

1997 I.C.J.(Sept. 25)(separate opinion of Judge Weermantry) (visited Sept. 8, 1998)
<http://www.icj-dj.org>. Accord Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Dep't of Env't & Nat. Res.,
33 I.L.M. 173 (1994)(Philippines). In the Oposa case, the Philippines government granted

licenses for timber extraction covering an aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares at a time
when the forest cover of the entire country was estimated at 1. million hectares. The plaintiffs
(minors joined by their parents) sued on grounds of inter-generational equity and right to self-

preservation, and pleaded for certiorari to quash the grants. The Philippines Supreme Court
held, interalia, that the plaintiffs had standing to represent their yet unborn posterity.
17. See RUNGERMEcHHD, LANDLAWANDLANDUsE CONTROLN WESnm SUDAN: THE
CASE OpSouiemw DARFUR 53 (1987). Note that land is defined at customary law to include
not only land itself, but also the things on the soil which are enjoyed as naturally belonging
on the land, such as rivers, streams, lakes, lagoons, woods, wild vegetation. In short, land

"includes any estate or right in or over the land or over any of the other things which land
denotes, for example, right to hunt, collect snails etc." N.A. OLLENU, PRINCIPLES OF
CUSTOMARY LAND LAW INGHANA 1 (1962).

18. OLLENU, supra note 17, at 4.
19.

G.E MErcALFE, GREAT BRITAIN AND GHANA: DocuMENs OF GHANA HISTORY 1807-

1957, 389 (1994). It must be noted that it is not correct to say that the land belonged to the
chief or headmen. Such leaders of the community merely held the land in trust for the entire
community. See KWAMENA BEmIqI-ENCHI., GHANA LAND LAW: AN DWOSSmON, ANALYSIS AND

CRITIQUE 41-65 (1964).
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practiced by the people.2" He argues that the principle, if it exists at all, is
not ubiquitous in all Ghanaian communities. He contends that there are
lands in the Volta Region of Ghana, for example, which were not owned by
anybody, albeit the chief of the traditional area had jurisdictional control
over the lands concerned.2
This debate was the basis of the first major political conflict
between the colonialists and the indigenous people. A serious Executive
intrusion into the customary land tenure system in Ghana was attempted
in 1897. The colonial government proposed a Lands Bill to vest all "waste"
lands in the Crown and to set up a concessions court to oversee the grant
of concessions by the natives. This Bill generated serious political agitation.
The indigenous educated elite and the chiefs teamed up to oppose it.' The
natives argued that there were no wastelands in the Gold Coast 2 and that
the colonial rulers aimed the Bill at expropriating indigenous lands. The
Bill was shelved mainly due to its opposition that threatened the ongoing
investment in gold mining.2
Two issues arise from the foregoing debate 25 What happens when
a piece of land is used in ways that could be injurious to adjoining
"ownerless" lands? Could the "ownerless" land be used in ways that are
harmful to the environment and to owners of adjoining lands? In response
to the first question, it can be argued that since the proponents of the
ownerless land theory agree that the chief or political head has jurisdictional control over lands in which there is no certain owner, and that the
political head has protective powers and functions over the lands in the
area, the chief therefore has the right to regulate activities done on

20. See A.K.P. Kludze, Ewe Law ofProperty, in 6 RESTATEMENT OF AFRICAN LAND LAW xi,
107-14 (Antony N. Allotted., 1973).
21. See id. at 113-14. Perhaps this is what influenced the formulation of section 19(2)(c)
of the Land Title Registration Law, P.N.D.C.L. 152 (1986) (Ghana), which provides that the
state shall be registered as the proprietor of land not held by any other proprietor. The
inspiration for the Land Title Registration Law may simply be pragmatism, seeing that since
colonial days land transactions and government requisition have produced ownerless or
quasi-ownerless lands where titles are disputed or improperly registered.
22. This led to the formation of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (a political
group) in 1897. See F.K BUAH, A HISTORY OF GHANA 93 (1980). See also ADU BOAHEN, GHANA:
EVOLTION AND CHANGE IN THE NINETEENTH AND TwE;TEH CIRI 62-66 (1975); KIJmN,
supranote 11, at 330-57.
23. See Kojo Bentsi-EnchiU, Colonial Land Policy With Particular Reference to the Mining
Sector (1988) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Bentsi-Enchill, Letsa and Mate Law
Firm, Accra, Ghana); J.E. CASELY HAYFORD, GOLD COAST NATIVE INSTIUTIONS 193-97 (1970).

24. The European mining interests also lobbied against the Bill mainly because of the
proposed five percent royalty. See Lillian P. Walker, The Gold Mining Industry in Ghana 64-65
(1971) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Edinburgh University) (on file with Edinburgh University
Library).
25. On the assumption that there are "ownerless" or "quasi ownerless" lands in Ghana.
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"ownerless" lands that could endanger the environment and adjoining
lands. Under this theory the chief or the political authorities can pursue
anybody who uses his or her land in ways that are detrimental to adjoining
unowned land. As to the second question, if the environmental impact of
any activity is felt on land that is owned, then the landowner clearly has
locus standi to seek remedies within the existing legal order. The landowner
may seek remedies against whomever, for the time being, interferes with
his or her free enjoyment of the property, even if the interference originates
on unowned land. It can be concluded therefore, that whether or not a
particular piece of land is owned by an individual or by a group, that land
cannot be used in a way that affects the environment adversely, nor can it
be made to suffer the brunt of harmful environmental consequences from
the use of adjoining land.
The next principle of customary land tenure that is relevant to
responsibility for environmental damage is that the stool, or chief, and his
elders form a management committee that is entrusted with the responsibility for managing the entire stool property, particularly land. The
Committee has the right to sue for the preservation and protection of stool
land.
The stool or skin constitutes a corporation; and the occupant
of the stool or skin, or the head of the tribe, together with his
elders and counsellors, are trustees holding the lands for the
use of the community, the tribe and the family. The stool or
skin means the community or tribe as a whole being under
a duty to protect the land for the quiet enjoyment of the
beneficial interests therein, to mobilize all subjects or members to go to war against a foreign invader or to contribute
money to fight a lawsuit against a foreign power or subject
of a foreign power who disturbs the possession of a subject.'
It is the stoolF represented by the chief and his elders or the family
head and his elders, which has the responsibility for taking action to
protect the condition of the stool or family land. This principle was
resolved in the case of Keelson v. Mensah in which the court held that "[i]t
is a well settled principle of native custom that, except in very special

26. OLLEU, sura note 17, at 5-9. See generally S.KB. ASANTE, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL
GOALS IN GHANA 1844-1966 (1975) (discussing the history of property law in Ghana with
respect to the role of the stool); BENSTI-ENCHILL, supra note 19, at 1.

27. The "stool" or "skin" is the shrine that embodies the soul and spirit of the family,
community or nation and is a representation of the authority of all the members of the
community. It is also the symbol of the legality or accreditation of the chief or head of family
or community. See OLLENU, supra note 17, at 6. The stool is also regarded in Ghanaian

jurisprudence as an artificial person as in the case of business companies. In ordinary
Ghanaian parlance, the stool is a traditional chair mainly made of wood.
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circumstances, only the head of the family can sue or be sued in respect of
family property."' It must be pointed out that the communal land interest
that the political leadership manages is the highest in the hierarchical order
of interests in customary land law. This interest is often described as the
allodial or paramount interest or title. ' It is normally vested in the whole
community, family or group and can only pass to another community or
group.?° The head of the group or community who manages commonly
held property is in the position of a trustee and cannot manage the land in
ways that would be injurious to the interest of the entire community."1 The
head cannot grant land for mining purposes that engender serious
environmental consequences for the members of the community. He is
answerable to the members of the group for the regulation of the environmental implications of mining on the communal land granted.
Apart from the allodial interest, there are lesser interests that can
be held in land. These are the usufruct or customary freehold, customary
tenancies and pledges?' For the purposes of this discussion, the analysis is
limited to the customary freehold or the usufruct, also known as the
determinable interest. The usufructuary title is the highest estate that a
subject of a land-owning stool or an individual member of a land-owning
family can hold in the stool or family land. Some of the features of this
interest, as noted previously, include the inherent right of a subject of the
stool or a member of the family to go onto any uncultivated or unoccupied
piece of the stool or family land and reduce it to his or her occupation and
use.' This interest can be determined without affecting the community's
ownership and it is inheritable and alienable inter vivos.O All that the
subject usufructuary is required to do is to perform customary services
28. [195712 W.A.LR. 271 (West African Law Reports) (Ghana). The special circumstance
exemptions from the Kelson rule were elaborated in the case of Kvan v. Nyieni, [19591 G.L.R.
67, 72 (Ghana Law Reports), and include where the property is in danger of being
irretrievably lost and the head is either unconcerned or colludes in it. The customary law
position is now altered by statute. Under the Head of Family (Accountability) Law,
P.N.D.C.L. 114 (1985) (Ghana), what may appear to be a radical departure from judicial
customary law, the head of family can be sued by accredited members of the family to account
for his stewardship of the family property-in most cases real property.
29. See OLLENU, supra note 17, at 4-6.
30. See id.
31. See id. For the operation of this mechanism in Nigeria see D. J.BAKsINGA, LAW OF
TRUSTS INNIGERLA 2-7 (1989).
32. See OLLENU, supra note 17,79-107.
33. This principle is only of historical interest as the current legal practice is that the
subject must seek the permission of the appropriate authorities before taking possession of
any piece of the family or stool land. See Amatei v. Hammond, 11981] G.L.R. 300 (Ghana Law
Reports); Land Title Registration Law, P.N.D.C.L. 152 (1986) (Ghana).
34. See the Privy Council decision in Amodu Tijani v. Secretary to the Government of
Nigeria, [192112 A.C. 399,404 (Appeals Case) (Eng.).
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such as providing specified parts of game meat periodically to the allodial
title holder, and generally to participate in customary rites performed for
the general well-being of the community and its land. ' The usufructuary
is responsible for any environmental damage caused by the particular use
to which his land is put. He is also responsible for taking action to preserve
the land under occupation from damage caused by the use to which
adjoining lands are put. This means that the diversion of water, for
example, in ways that flood the land of another, can occasion legal action
against the person whose activities caused the flooding. At the same time,
if a subject usufructuary mines gold or other minerals from the land and
adjoining lands are adversely affected, the owners of the adjoining lands
can take action at customary law, or in more recent times, at.common law,
against the miner for the damage done to the land.3'
Due to the historical designation of mining fields to the
usufructuary under customary law and the relatively low environmental
impact of indigenous gold mining problems of ownership of land and of
responsibility for the environment were very rare in the past. However,
with the introduction of European mining technology, the English legal
tradition and the assumption of wide powers by the modem state, issues
regarding ownership and environmental responsibility have emerged.
Among the questions currently asked are, Whether the holders of
customary interests in the mining lands have been divested of their
interests in such lands by the state and/or by virtue of their granting
concessions to mining companies? Whether the traditional authorities have
the legal capacity to take action against the mining concerns that damage
the environment? Who takes the reversionary interest in the mining land
after the mining is done? The next part of this article looks at the concessions regime and the legislation on land and mining to establish who has
legal standing to sue for damage done to the environment by modem
forms of mining.

35. See OLLENU, supra note 17, at 54.
36. The customary freehold or usufruct appears to be only of historical and academic
significance as the Ghana Constitution negates it. GHANA CoNST. art. 267(5) (1992). It is
argued, however, that since a substantial part of land in Ghana has been acquired or managed
under customary freehold principles, issues of land tenure would invariably continue to
revolve around customary freehold or usufruct. This is so especially since the usufruct is often
a derivative of the allodial interest which is not affected by the constitutional provision. It is
the author's view that the authors of article 267(5) did not sufficiently think through the
provision. Authoritative judicial pronouncement must be awaited.
37. See Francis N. Botchway, Pre-colonialMethods of Gold Mining and Environmental
Protectionin Ghana, 13 J.ENERGY &NAT. RESOuRcEs L. 299,308-11 (1995); TIMOTHY GARRARD,
AKAN WEIGH AND THE GOLD TRADE 128-41 (1980).
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CONCESSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
MINING ENVIRONMENT
The last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of
the twentieth century are often described as the concession era in what was
then the Gold Coast. Three main "gold rushes" occurred during this
period,' during which more than 25,000 square miles were given as
concessions to approximately four hundred mining interests." Most of the
concession agreements established between the chiefs and European
mining concerns had expansive terms. For example, in one concession the
following provision existed: "the concession confers rights of mining for
gold, precious stones and minerals of all and every description and kind
whatsoever and rights subsidiary and auxiliary thereto. " '° Given the
background of British-Ashanti military conflicts, a few bottles of rum by
the concessionaire were enough to serve as consideration for such
economically important contracts of very long duration.41 The boom in the
concession market led to frauds that provided a recipe for conflicts as there
was virtually no control over the granting of concessions, nor over the
exercising of rights conferred thereby. This formed the basis for the
conclusion that the "indiscriminate granting of Concessions will lead to
serious complications in the future unless rules and regulations are
established for the guidance of the Europeans and natives. " '
In 1900 the colonial legislature passed the Concessions Ordinance.
The Ordinance acknowledged that the land of the colony was the property
of the indigenous people. The Crown made no overt claim to land in the
colony except what it had purchased or acquired for public use. The
Crown's claim presupposed that the freedom to contract between the
indigenous landowners and concessionaires with regard to the mining land
was preserved. However, the Ordinance created a concessions court that
was authorized to authenticate native grants of land for mining. Indeed, no
grant of rights in or over land was valid unless the court had certified its
38. See Walker, supra note 24, at xii, 69. See also Paul Rosenblum, The Gold Mining
Industry in Ghana 1874-1910,1-94 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University)
(on file with the Columbia University Library).
39. See C.W. NEwBuKY, BRmISH PoUcY TOwARDS WEST AFRICA; SELECTED DOCUMENTS
1875-1914, at 594 (1971).
40. Kofi Mbiah, The Nature of the Mining Concessions Signed between the Chiefs of the
Gold Coast and the European Concessionaires and its Impact on the Native Gold Mining
Industry 4-16 (1980) (unpublished LL.B. dissertation, University of Ghana Law School) (on
file with the University of Ghana Law Library).
41. As Sir Freeling contended, the natives would not give mining land willingly "even
if large payment were made." MSTALFE, supra note 19, at 388. Therefore, in many instances
force was used to "acquire" the land.
42. Walker, supra note 24, at 60 (quoting Civil Commissioner Higgins).
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validity.'3 The conditions spelled out in the Ordinance for ascertaining the
validity of the grant included the following: the grants had to be between
two parties represented by the appropriate person who also understood its
terms; the grants must have adequate consideration and must not have
been obtained by fraud; all the grants' terms and conditions had to be
performed completely; and the grants must reasonably protect the
customary rights of the people with respect to agricultural cultivation,
firewood collection, hunting and snaring of game."
Though the Ordinance was aimed at regulating the concessions
regime in the Gold Coast, it did little to clarify and settle the precise rights
and responsibilities of both the concessionaires and the indigenous
grantors in respect to the regulation and protection of the mining environment. The requirement that the grant should be in writing (in the English
language) was dictated mainly by European mining interests. An overwhelming majority of the natives and their chiefs were not knowledgeable
in the English language and had little appreciation of the effect of their
grants being reduced into writing in the English language. As Ndulo
observed,
These documents... were fairly technical even by modem
standards. It was therefore unlikely that any African chief at
the time could have comprehended the meaning of words
such as "latitude' or indeed the meaning of mineral rights as
distinguished from land rights. And since these tidy European concepts have no counterparts in customary law, it is
probable that no amount of interpreting could have made the
chiefs appreciate the significance of the documents. Hence
there is reason to suspect that most of the concessions were
obtained by deception.'
The few indigenous lawyers who appreciated the meaning and
effect of the grants often colluded with the chiefs and mining interests to
exact wide terms of concession from the indigenous people." "It will thus

43. See HAYFORD, supra note 23, at 198-207. In some ways this is similar to land title
registration as under the Land Title Registration Law, P.N.D.C.L. 152 (1986) (Ghana).
44. See NEWBURY, supra note 39, at 583; HAYFORD, supra note 23, at 206.
45. MuNA NDULO, MINING RIGH3 INZAMBIA 33 (1987). See also Anthony Anghie, The
HeartofMy Home: Colonialism, Environmental Damage,and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. IWrL L.
445,472-73 (1993).
46. See NEWBURY, supra note 39, at 584. For an example of tactics the concessionaires
used, Ndulo quotes a Palace official as saying that.
One day a Mr Sharpe turned up with a paper which he asked me to get
Mushili to sign. I read the paper through and found that it made over the
mineral and land rights of the country to the company. I said I will take it
to the Chief, but I think he is going to be very angry when I translate it to
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be observed that of their volition, and acting in ignorance... of the
character and extent of the public rights with which they were parting...
the chiefs of the Gold Coast have in the past thirteen years alienated an
area which actually exceeds the total area of the colony itself."' 7
The Concessions Ordinance also failed to require the terms and
conditions of the grants to include any provisions relating to protection of
the environment, nor did it indicate the courses opened to the indigenous
people by which to take steps to prevent damage to the mining environment. The Ordinance's use of "proper persons" to the concession agreement referred mainly to the proper native vested with authority to grant
land. This, as noted above, could mean the chief and his elders or the
person holding the usufructuary interest. Due to improper understanding
of indigenous land tenure schemes, most of the concessionaires relied on
chiefs who, though having political jurisdiction over the specific areas, did
not have proprietary rights over the lands they granted." This weakened
and confused the capacity of individual natives and sub-groups to take
action to protect the mining environment because the person who granted
the concession on the land might not have the right to sue in respect to that
land.
The Concessions Ordinance did provide for time limitations on
grants, however. A concession could not be granted for more than ninetynine years, and its area could not be larger than five square miles.
Nevertheless, these requirements were subverted in practice. "The clause
restricting area [was] readily evaded by people getting grants in different
names and then amalgamating . . ., Indeed, if the creation of the
concessions court and the restriction in the size and duration of the
him. Mr Sharpe told me not to translate it and asked me to just get him to
sign it. I told him that as a Christian I could not do such a thing. Sharpe
agreed to the document being read, I read it to Mushili, the Chief was very
angry and expelled Sharpe from the country.
NDuLo, supra note 45, at 34. In the Chidda Concession Enquiry, the chiefs opposed the grant
of a certificate of validity on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation and deceit. The Chidda
Concession Enquiry No. 5 (Cape Coast, Mar. 1901) reprintedin HAYFORD, supra note 23, app.
A at 289.
47. NEWBURY, supra note 39, at 594. See also Crayem v. Consolidated African Trust Ltd.,
[1949112 W.A.C.A. 443 (West African Court of Appeals Reports) (Ghana).
48. See NEWBURY, supra note 39, at 583. See alsoWiredu v. Mim Timber Co. Ltd., [1963]
2 G.L.R. 167 (Ghana Law Reports). Concession Enquiry No. 1118, [19611 G.LR. 448 (Ghana
Law Reports); NDULO, supra note 45, ch. 2; Owusu v. Mantse of Labadi, [1933] 1W.A.C.A. 278

(West African Court of Appeal Reports) (Ghana).
49. See NEWBURY, supra note 39, at 584. Before the Ordinance came into force, concessions
of a hundred square miles were granted to the Ashanti Goldfields Company. KIMBLE, supra
note 11, at 23-24. MCPHE, supra note 12, at 159. The Ashanti Goldfields Company is a leading
player in the international metals business and is currently registered on the New York,
Ghana and London Stock Exchanges.
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concessions were meant to prevent rampant alienation of land for mining,
they had little impact. In the thirteen years between 1900-1913 a total area
of 25,108 square milesof land was alienated.'
An outstanding omission of the Ordinance was the failure to clarify
and distinguish between "native rights" and the rights of the concessionaires in the granted area. The provision protecting customary rights in
respect to cultivation, collection of firewood and hunting did not mean that
the indigenous people had the right to stay or to live in the concession area.
On the contrary, it restricted them in their occupation and use of the land.
Yet the law's lack of clarity resulted in the continuous occupation of parts
of the concession area by the natives. It can thus be said that by means of
"concessions" the natives became aliens on the lands they transferred to
mining interests. Those who stayed on the land stayed at the sufferance of
the concessionaires. Whether they could challenge the environmental
effects of mining on the concession land was a question even more
uncertain."1 Therefore, the people were virtually bereft of any standing
founded on proprietorship to question the environmental ramifications of
the use to which the concessions were put, in this context, mining. Given
the natives' incapacity to sue over environmental degradation, it was left
to the government to protect the people and the land. Yet during this
period "the most serious feature... [was] the failure of the government to
protect5 2the present and future generations of natives in their public
rights.
The Concessions Ordinance of 1900 was replaced by the Concessions Ordinance of 1939. The 1939 Ordinance had almost the same features
as the 1900 one.' The 1939 definition of a concession, however, excluded
any lease, concession or assignment of rights or title or interest in minerals
within a town or village.' This aggravated the confusion regarding the
rights of the occupants of the land and those of the mining interests. The
exclusion of towns and villages led the people to believe that the grant of
concessions did not affect their interests and rights in other land that
remained, for the time being, occupied. In fact, considering the small size
of towns and villages in Ghana during the colonial period, it was an

50. See NEWBURY, supra note 39, at 594. Approximately one thousand square miles
involved the alienation of surface rights.
51. See Gliksten (West Africa) Ltd. v. Appiah, [1967] G.L.R 447 (Ghana Law Reports).
52.

REPORT OF WEsT AFRICAN LANDs CoMMrrrEE, C.O. 879/116, No. 1046 (Colonial

Office, London, 1912-1914)(on file with author).
53. This included the requirement of writing in English, proof of the validity of the
concession before the High court (then Supreme Court), etc. See HAYFORD, supra note 23.
54. See Concessions Ordinance of 1939, Cap. 136, § 2 (Ghana).
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illusory compromise to exclude those areas from the concession areas.5 It
does appear that, with the exclusion of villages and towns from concession
areas, the rights of the indigenous people over the concession area were
nearly severed, and with them went the capacity to sue for the degradation
caused by mining on the concession land. If anything, the indigenous
peoples' right to sue was limited to the towns and villages. Moreover, the
Ordinance did not apply to the largest mines, such as Ashanti Goldfields
Company and the Castle Gold Mining Syndicate.
In addition to the exclusion of towns and villages from concessions, the 1939 Concessions Ordinance prohibited the certification of
concessions that granted or purported to grant rights to remove the
indigenous people from their habitations within the area of such concession. 7 The question left unanswered was what were the rights of the
natives on such concessions? While the question cannot be clearly
answered, consolation can be found in the fact that irrespective of the
agreement by the parties in the concession agreement, the concessions
court had the power to modify, alter or vary the terms of a concession. The
court could also impose such conditions as it deemed fit with respect to the
grant of certificates of validity. The Governor also had discretion to extend
the limits prescribed for concessions or to cancel concessions already
granted to non-British subjects if he considered the grant prejudicial to
public safety interests.' Nevertheless, there is no record of the exercise of
the powers of the court, nor of the Governor's use of his discretion to state
the rights of the natives to protect themselves against mining's environmental effects, or to impose environmental obligations on the concessionaires.
The effect of a certificate of validity granted by the court was that
it was good and valid from the date of its issue against any person claiming
adversely thereto. It was also effective in respect to the whole area of land
contained within the boundaries stated in such certificate, irrespective of
any discrepancy between such area and the area indicated by the notice
and plan previously published. Additionally, it was conclusive evidence of

55. Obuasi, the biggest mining town in Ghana, was allegedly made up of about 100
houses with a population of perhaps less than 1,000 people. The entire population of Ghana
before 1960 was less than six million. MK HuM, THE ECONOMY OF GHANA 40 (1989). In 1998
it is estimated at 18 million. Ghana Embassy, Washington, DC. (visited Sept. 17, 1998)
<http://www.usembassy.org.gh/cs-ghgla.htn>.
56. See Concessions Ordinance of 1939, Cap. 136, § 50 (Ghana).
57. See id. § 13(8).
58. See id. §§ 22, 28. For an example of the use of Executive power of intervention in
concession proceedings, see Concession Enquiry No. 2384 (Sekondi), Sentum Bonsa Timber Lands
Concession Maatschappij de FijnhouthandelN.V. (Fynhout) v. MinisterResponsiblefor Lands, [19631
1 G.L.R. 471 (Ghana Law Reports).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

the satisfaction of all the requirements of the Ordinance under which it was
granted. It could not be impeached by any person for lack of notice of the
boundaries nor any other reason, except fraud proven against the holder
of the concession s9 This aspect of the Ordinance was affirmed in Gliksten
WIA Ltd. v. Appiah.W The court, per Amissah J.A., held that "section 32(1)
and (2) of the Concessions Ordinance, Cap. 136 was so sweeping in their
conferment of rights on a concessionaire that, fraud apart, his title was
good against the whole world and took precedence over the holder of
customary rights."61 This negated any pretensions that the Ordinance was
aimed at protecting the rights of natives in a concession area. Gliksten's
holding leads to a somewhat disturbing conclusion, that the indigenous
person occupying land in the concession area, despite his or her receipt of
rent for the concession62 and the apparent protection of customary and
religious sites and rights, was virtually powerless to take action to protect
the land in the concession area from the environmental consequences of
mining activities.
In June 1962 the Concessions Act was passed which substantially
repealed the Concessions Ordinance of 1939.' Though it did not affect the
then existing concessions, it provided that the terms of such concessions
could be varied by agreement between the parties subject to the consent of
the Minister.6" Additionally, the Minister could on his own initiative call for
the cancellation of any existing concession on any of the following grounds:
whenever the Minister was satisfied that there had been a breach of a term
of the concession; whenever the holder of a concession unreasonably
withheld consent to a variation of the concession's terms which in the
Minister's opinion had become oppressive due to a change in economic
conditions; whenever the land specified in the concession had not been
developed or used in accordance with the grant's objective; whenever the
legally enforceable limits for the area of the concession had been
exceeded.' Again, despite the Minister's discretionary power, there is no
record of the variation or cancellation of any terms on the ground that the
exercise of rights under the said concession was prejudicial to the safety of
the physical environment, or that the concession agreement divested the

59. See Concessions Ordinance of 1939, Cap. 136, § 32 (Ghana). S.G.M.C. v. Pieterson and
others, [1988] G.L.R. 38 (Ghana Law Reports).
60. Gliksten W/A Ltd v. Appiah, [1%7] G.L.R. 447,449 (Ghana Law Reports). Contrast
this with the Australian case of Mabo v. State of Queensland (No. 2), [1992] 66 A.L.G.R. 408
(Local Government Reports of Australia).
61. Gliksten, [1967] G.L.R. at 449.
62. See Concessions Ordinance of 1939, Cap. 136, § 35(1), (2) (Ghana).
63. Concessions Act, Act 124, § 1 (1962) (Ghana).
64. See id. § 2(a).
65. See id. § 3(1).
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natives who owned that land of any power(s) to challenge the environmental effects of mining on the land. The Act was explicit, however, on the
circumstances or conditions that could call for the variation of the terms of
the concession, and it stated, inter ala,that changes in economic conditions
or the nationality of the concessionaires could be the basis for concession
modification."
The Act, like the Ordinance, provided for the payment of rent by
every holder of a mining concession, but, unlike the Ordinance, it did not
specify who, ultimately, was to receive the rent.67 If the person to whom the
rent had to be paid had been specified in the Concessions Act, it would
have helped clarify the legal rights and relations between the concessionaires and the indigenous grantor(s). Be that as it may, the Concessions Act
fails to indicate any conferment of rights or vestiges of ownership to the
indigenous grantor in the concession area, at least to enable him or her to
question environmental degradation on the mining land.
The lack of specific legal protection for indigenous people appears
to have presented little difficulties to either those who administered the law
or to the mining interests. One reason was that most of the mining ventures
in the colonial and early post-colonial period were underground operations
and could, to a large extent, co-exist with significant human settlements on
the same concession area. This coexistence was important because any
movement of the indigenous people from the concession area would have
awakened the people to the largesse of the concessions they granted, and
this would have been prejudicial to the mining interests. Furthermore, the
issue of ownership and the exercise of incidents thereto did not surface
largely because it did not form the foundation for any immediate benefit
or query as to the exercise of rights in the concession. As the people become
more environmentally aware, and as they become more cognitive of
English legal principles and processes, issues concerning land ownership
and responsibility for the mining environment are bound to come to the
fore.
Attempts have been made to reform the land tenure schemes in
Ghana since the country attained independence." These efforts imposed a

66. See id. § 3(1), (5).
67. See id. § 10(1). See also Concessions Ordinance of 1939, Cap. 136, §§ 27, 35(l), (2)
(Ghana).
68. The political history of Ghana since colonial rule has, expectedly, affected the legal
development of the country. In particular the titles given to legislation have changed with
almost every governing regime. Colonial legislation (1874-1957) was generally called an
Ordinance or a Cap. Constitutional governments called the legislation they passed Acts (19571966, 1969-1972, 1979-1981 and 1993-present). Military juntas variously called their legislation
Decrees (1%6-1969,1972-1979) and Laws (1981-1992). Unlike the Civilian governments, the
Military regimes used their respective collective names as the short title for the laws they
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myriad of laws, many of which were not well designed, on the pre-existing
legal arrangements. The extent to which these laws confront the issues of
land ownership and responsibility for the mining environment is the
subject of discussion in the next section.
THE STATUTORY ARRANGEMENTS FOR LAND OWNERSHIP
AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY (1962-1998)
The difficulties of pursuing remedies against environmental
damage are due to the maze of legislative arrangements regulating the
grant of land for mining and the concomitant operation of common law
principles on the issue. This section examines the statutory arrangements
for access to mining land, the obligations of the mineral rights holder and
the statutory options open to the victim of environmental degradation
caused by mining.
The early 1960s have been described as a watershed era in the
enactment of legislation on land in Ghana.' Most of these statutes effected
significant modifications in the land tenure system as a whole. Moreover,
in 1986 a new legal regime for mining in Ghana was adopted that relied on
the pre-existing land tenure system as far as its provisions on land
ownership and use are concerned." The Minerals and Mining Law of 1986
has a number of significant provisions which affect land tenure and the
responsibility for environmental degradation on mining land.
Under section 2 of the Minerals and Mining Law, the President
may acquire any land or authorize the occupation and use of any land that
is required to secure the development or utilization of a mineral resource
under any applicable law. The applicable law refers mainly to the
Administration of Lands Act, Act 123 (1962), and the State Lands Act, Act
125 (1962).' Under the Administration of Lands Act, there were three

passed, for example National Liberation Council Decree (N.L.C.D.), Provisional National
Defence Council Law (P.N.D.C.L.). These titles are prominent in this work. See Fui Tsikata,
supra note 5, for an outline of some of these political developments in relation to mining.
Though not necessarily parallel, the reporting of cases also followed a political pattern. The
systematic reporting of cases started with the West Africa Court of Appeals Reports.
(W.A.C.A.) (1928-1957), and after independence, Ghanaian superior court decisions are
reported in the Ghana Law Reports (G.LR.) (1959-present). See DANIELS, supra note 12, at 401402. Prior to these reports there were, with particular reference to land, compilations and
reporting of cases by Renner, Sarbah, Danquah and the Land Court Reports.
69. An unprecedented ten statutes on land were passed during the period. See generally,
Asante Ansong, Compulsory Land Purchase and Compensation, 8 REVIEW OF GHANA LAW 28
(1976) (providing an overview of legislation passed from 1962 to 1976).
70. See Minerals and Mining Law, P.N.D.C.L. 153, § 2 (1986) (Provisional National
Defense Council Law) (Ghana).
71. These statutes are substantially modified by Ghana's 1992 Constitution, arts. 265-68.
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options available to the President. Section 1 of the Administration of Lands
Act vested the administration of stool lands in the President.' The
President could, under the authority of administering the land, determine
that it is proper for the land to be granted for mining or other purposes. To
avoid complications and abuses of the land trust relationships, the
President, when granting stool lands, would initially issue an Executive
Instrument declaring the stool land in question, as vested in him, in trust.
He could take this step if it appeared to him that it was in the public
interest to do so.' After the publication of the instrument, it will be lawful
for the President to execute any deed or do any act as a trustee in respect
to the land specified in the instrument. The President can therefore grant
any land covered by the instrument to any mining company for mining
purposes. '
A more sweeping provision and one that gives the President the
power to grant stool land without necessarily being held responsible for the
consequences of the grant is section 10 of the Administration of Lands Act.
It provides:
The President may authorize the occupation and use of any
land to which this Act applies for any purpose which, in his
opinion, is conducive to the public welfare or the interests of
the State, and may pay into the appropriate account out of
moneys [sic] granted by vote of Parliament such annual sums
as appear to him, having regard to the value of the land, and
on the other hand, to the benefits derived by the people of the
area in which the land is situated from the use of the land, to
be proper payments to be made for the land.
A similar provision exists in section 1 of the State Lands Act, Act
125 (1962), amended by the National Liberation Council Decree 234 (1969),
for the acquisition of both stool and other lands. In land acquisition the
President follows a simple procedure. First, he authorizes the occupation
72. Formerly, no stool lands could be granted without the consent of the Administrator
of Stool Lands appointed by the President. Ghana's 1992 Constitution changed this
requirement, however. Presently, all stool lands are vested in the appropriate stools in trust
for the people in the area. Nevertheless, Article 267(3) of the 1992 Constitution requires the
consent of the Lands Commission for any disposition or development of any stool land.
73. See GHANA CoNSr. art. 20(1)(a) (1992); Administration of Lands Act, Act 123, § 10
(1962) (Ghana); and State Lands Act, Act 125, §§ 1, 2 (1962) (Ghana).
74. Administration of Lands Act, Act 123, § 10 (1962) (Ghana); and State Lands Act, Act
125, §§ 1, 2 (1962) (Ghana).
75. The President would act as a trustee for and on behalf of the stool concerned. See, e.g.,
Administration of Lands Act, Act 123, § 10 (1962) (Ghana). The interests of the stool subjects,
for example their right to a clean environment, could therefore not be jeopardized in the
exercise of the powers of a trustee. If that happened, the stool subjects represented by their
elders could sue the President for breach of trust.
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and use of the land, then he publishes a notice in the gazette giving details
of the land, the use to which it is intended to be put and any payments to
be made in respect of the use of the land.' When any person suffers special
loss as the result of an occupational authorization under section 1 of the
State Lands Act, he shall be paid such compensation as the Minister, or, on
appeal, a tribunal may determine."
It is submitted that the public interest condition for the presidential
authorization of the occupation of land is broad enough to cover the
authorization of land for mining purposes.' The revenue generated by the
government from mining activity (mainly taxes) goes into the consolidated
fund and is used for the benefit of the country.
The provisions of the two Acts imply that all previous rights to
lands acquired by the state and authorized by the President to be occupied
and used for mining are extinguished. The previous holders of any rights
in such land have only one right reserved for them, the right to compensation. The compensation is to be based on the value of the land, which may
or may not take into account the mineral resources of the land. It is
doubtful that the computation of the compensation would include the
value of mineral reserves because all minerals in their raw form anywhere
in Ghana are vested in the President in trust for the people." Therefore, the
compensation will likely be for the value of the land only.
A second important variable to be considered in the calculation of
compensation is the benefit derived by the indigenous people from the use
of the land. There is no indication of what benefits are contemplated by the
Act or of how the value of such benefits is to be computed. One thing,
however, is clear, the adverse environmental effects from the concessionaire's use of the land are not a crucial factor. Apparently, section 10(3)
favors mining interests. It provides that where any person suffers special
loss as a result of the authorization, he or she shall be paid such compensation as the Minister or, on appeal, a tribunal of three members appointed
under the Act shall determine. The application for the compensation must
be made within three months of the publication of the gazette notice of the
authorization. Obviously, the Act assumes that any "special loss" could be
determined up-front, and could be paid for with money. It is an incontrovertible fact that the environmental consequences of mining manifest after

76. Under section 1 of the State Lands Act, before such action is lawful the President must
order the publication of an Executive Instrument and must give a month's notice in writing
before entering the land for any purpose incidental to the declaration.
77. Administration of Lands Act, §§ 10(2)-(5); State Lands Act, § 4.
78. Public interest is defined to include any right or advantage that inures or is intended
to inure to the general benefit of the whole of the people of Ghana. GHANA CONST. art. 295
(1992).
79.

GHANA CONST. art. 257(6) (1992).
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the development of the mine, and almost always take place after the three
months prescribed for petitioning for compensation have passed. For
people who bear the brunt of such environmental damage, their loss may
not qualify as special, so they may not be entitled to any compensation.
Furthermore, people entitled to compensation may not have legal
standing to claim it. This is because under section 17 of the Administration
of Lands Act:
[a]ll revenues from lands subject to this Act shall be collected
by the Minister and for that purpose all rights to receive and
all remedies to recover that revenue shall vest in him and,
subject to the exercise of any power of delegation conferred
by this Act, no other person shall have power to give a good
discharge for any liability in respect of the revenue or to
exercise any such right or remedy.'o
All said and done, strict application of the Administration of Lands
Act and the State Lands Act deprives the previous land owner or holder of
any right that confers the capacity to pursue legal action for mining's
environmental damage to concession lands authorized by the President.'
It must be pointed out, however, that the owners or occupiers of land
outside the acquired area could pursue legal action against the user of the
land authorized to be occupied by the President. Where the activities on
granted land adversely affect the use and enjoyment of the rights of the
owner or occupier of adjacent land not acquired by the President, legal
action is indeed permissible.'m This point is important because the
environmental ramifications of mining know no boundaries and could
affect lands many miles away.'

80. Administration of Lands Act, § 17(1). Revenue is defined in section 17(2) of the Act
to include all rents, dues, fees, royalties, levies, tributes, payments, whether in the nature of
income or capital, from or in connection with lands subject to the Act. For an example of
confusion over authority or power to collect revenue in respect to mining land see PEOPLE'S
DAILY GRAPHic, Sept. 12,1997, at 1.
81. Under section 5 of the State Lands Act, the President may grant leases and licenses
in respect to any land acquired under the Act. The President literally usurps the rights of the
previous owner of the land so acquired and could hold the lessee or licensee responsible for
any environmental damage on the land, for example, where such damage affects the
reversionary interest in the land.
82. Section 6 of the State Lands Act defines "other damage" as damage sustained by any
person having a right or interest in the land or in the adjoining land at the date of the
declaration. See also § 4(1) of the Act.
83. In CambridgeWaterCo. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather[199411 All EJ. 53 (All England
Law Reports), the pollution of ground water manifested 1.3 miles away from the site of the
chemical activity.
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The two statutes on compulsory acquisition of land by the states
were modified significantly by the 1992 Constitution. Under Article 20(ii)
of the Constitution, no property of any description, or interest in or right
over any property shall be compulsorily taken possession of or acquired by
the state. There is a broad exception to this rule for acquisitions necessary
in the interest of defense, public safety, public order, public morality,
public health, town and country planning or the development or utilization
of property to promote public benefit. Unlike the previous statutory
regime, the reasons for the acquisition must be clearly stated.' The public
benefit clause is, however, similar to the orientation of the two previous
statutes and it constitutes enough authority to acquire lands for mining
activities. At the same time, the public safety and public health provisions
could entitle the state to compulsorily take over lands already granted for
mining activity if such activity is found to endanger the health or safety of
the people in the area. However, if the state compulsorily acquires land for
mining activity it is unlikely that the state will be held responsible for the
environmental consequences of mining. This is especially so where, as has
been the practice, the state grants such land to separate and independent
entities for mining purposes. Likewise, if the state takes over mined lands
on grounds of public safety or health, the state may not be amenable to a
suit on grounds of sovereign immunity." This may complicate the pursuit
of the company or person whose activities engendered the threat.
Generally, where land is compulsorily acquired under the
Constitution, prompt and fair compensation must be paid.' This implies
that all rights of the previous holders of any interest would be subsequently extinguished. They cannot sue or be sued in regard to any damage
to that land. In the case of land acquired for mining purposes under the
customary or colonial and post-colonial laws, a reversionary interest may
still remain with the previous owners. In that case, their right to sue for
damage done to the land by mining activities can be said to have been
suspended during the time when the mining is in progress and when the
mining company has lawful possession of the land. At any rate, if
environmental damage is such that it affects the owner's reversionary
interest, then he may have standing to bring an action in court. In either
case, if they resettle on land not subject to the acquisition, they, as noted

84. The Administration of Lands Act, Act 123 (1962) and the State Lands Act, Act 125
(1962).
85. See GHANA CoNST. art. 20(b) (1992).
86. See the State Proceedings Act, Act 51, (1961) (Ghana), as amended by N.L.C.D. 352
(1969) (National Liberation Council Decree). At the time of writing, this legislation was slated
for review by the Ghanaian Parliament.
87. See GHANA CoNST. art. 20(2)(a) (1992).

Fall 19981

MINING ENVIRONMENT IN GHANA

above, could maintain an action if the resettlement site is endangered by
the mining activities of the land compulsorily acquired.'
Any land that was vested in the government of Ghana on behalf of
and in trust for the people of Ghana, and any other lands acquired in the
public interest before the Constitution came into force, are regarded as
public lands and vested in the President for and on behalf of the people of
Ghana.' Such public lands are to be managed by the Lands Commission
in co-ordination with the relevant public agencies."0 As noted earlier, legal
liability for activity on the public lands which adversely affects the peaceful
enjoyment of another person's land may lie with the government.
However, if the government grants leases or licenses to some person or
company, that person or company would be held legally responsible for its
activities.

Ordinarily, the government grants mining leases to corporate
bodies and partnerships. 1 Since such bodies have legal personalities of
their own they would be responsible for their activities. However, under
the Small Scale Gold Mining Law there is no incorporation requirement for
a license to mine for gold on a small scale.' Furthermore, there is no
provision in the Law authorizing the government to acquire land compulsorily for small-scale mining." The issue that arises therefore is who is
responsible for the environmental damage caused by small-scale mining?
It is submitted that the small-scale miners are responsible individually
and/or collectively for the environmental consequences of their mining
activities that affect people outside the designated mining area. This
conclusion is appropriate because, as individuals, small-scale miners have
full legal capacity to sue and be sued." Furthermore, though the small-scale

88. Under Article 20(3) of the 1992 Constitution, when a compulsory acquisition or
possession of land by the state involves displacement of any inhabitants, the state is to resettle the displaced inhabitants on suitable alternative land with due regard for their
economic well being and social and cultural values. See also GHANA CONST. art. 20(6) (1992).
89. See GHANA CONST. art. 257 (1992).
90. See GHANA CONsr. arts. 158,257 (1992).
91. See Minerals and Mining Law, P.N.D.C.L. 153, § 15 (1986) (Provisional National
Defense Council Law) (Ghana).
92. See Small Scale Gold Mining Law, P.N.D.C.L. 218, § 2 (1989) (Provisional National
DefenseCouncil Law) (Ghana).
93. Under section 77 of the Minerals and Mining Law, the Minister may simply designate
areas for small-scale mining. Section 12 of the Small Scale Gold Mining Law provides for
compensation to be paid by the miner to anybody who suffers any loss as a result of small
scale mining on that person's land.
94. Small Scale Gold Mining Law, §§ 2,4-5.
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miners have limited possession of the mining land, they do not mine as
agents of the government or, for that matter, any corporate body.95
Another issue is whether the owner of the land granted for smallscale mining can sue for the degradation of the land. The small-scale miner
is granted the license by the Minerals Commission and the Minister for a
limited period, and is to pay compensation to the owner of the land.* It is
not clear whether the receipt of the compensation extinguishes all the
interests and/or rights of the owner. To clarify the status of small-scale
mining lands the question becomes who holds the reversionary interest in
land granted to somebody other than the owner for small-scale mining? It
does not appear to be the intention of the Small Scale Gold Mining Law to
acquire -land compulsorily for small-scale mining. The designation of an
area for small-scale mining and the grant of licenses to mine on such lands
does not amount to compulsory acquisition by the state; it is an authorization of possession of the land by the state." The 1992 Constitutional
provisions on compulsory acquisition, however, cover land possession, and
so the constitutional requirements must be satisfied." If the constitutional
requirements are satisfied, it is submitted that the rights of the owner
whose land is granted for small scale mining may be, at a minimum,
suspended so that he or she cannot in the interim sue to protect, the land
from damage arising from the mining activity. In accordance with Article
20(6) of the Constitution, the land should be offered first to the previous
owner after the mining is ceased.
An additional factor to consider is the impact of the Minerals and
Mining Law in the areas of land ownership, possession and environmental
responsibility. The key issue here is the extent of the mining company's
power over the land covered by the mining lease. Whereas section 2 of the
Minerals and Mining Law provides that the President may acquire any
land and authorize its occupation for the development or utilization of
mineral resources, section 18(5) states that the mineral right granted by the
Minister shall be deemed a requisite and sufficient authority over the

95. Small-scale diamond mining in Akwatia maybe legally distinguished since the smallscale miners mine on Ghana Consolidated Diamonds' [hereinafter GCD] land and are more
or less agents of GCD.
96. See the Minerals and Mining Law, § 77, and the entire text of the Small Scale Gold
Mining Law.
97. Notwithstanding the possible payment of compensation to the landowner by the
miner. See GHANA CONST. art. 20 (1992); Minerals and Mining Law, § 2; Small Scale Gold

MiningLaw, § 12.
98. See GHANA CoNsT. art. 20(1) (1992). The requirements include adequate notice
detailing the reasons and necessity for the acquisition, legislation making provision for
prompt and fair compensation, right of access to the courts for redress, the use of the land
only for the purpose for which it was acquired, etc. See id. art. 20.
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respective land granted. It can be argued that the President's right to
acquire land for mining purposes under section 2 of the Minerals and
Mining Law is merely permissive and discretionary and therefore the
reading of section 18(5) leads to the conclusion that the grant of a mineral
right arms the mineral right holder with authority not otherwise proscribed
by law over the mining land. This conclusion is reinforced by the provision
in section 24 and 25(1) of the Minerals and Mining Law which states that
rental charges, royalties, fees, rents or other payments which fall due in
respect of any mineral right or otherwise shall be a debt due to the'
Republic. It logically follows that the rights of the previous owner of the
mining land are extinguished even if his or her land is not acquired
expressly, because rents, and to some extent royalty payments, are
important features of any lessor-lessee relationship." If the state authorizes
the occupation of the land for mining purposes and the Republic is entitled
to rents and royalties, what then is the position of the previous owner of
the land in question? His or her only recourse would be to seek compensation from the state."° If the previous owners' rights are indeed extinguished, the mining company cannot be sued by a private person for the
environmental degradation caused by the mining activity on the land
occupied with state authorization under the Minerals and Mining Law. The
company could, however, be pursued for damage done to lands other than
those occupied for the mining activity.
The power and responsibilities of the mineral right holder over the
mining area are further complicated by the limitations in the Minerals and
Mining law regarding the surface rights of the original occupants of the
mining land. The Law provides that "the holder of a mineral right shall
exercise his rights under this law subject to such limitations relating to
surface rights as the Minister may prescribe."" 1 This provision implies that
the mineral right holder may have his or her mining activities restricted in
the way(s) in which it affects the land surface. That restriction is to come
from the Minister only, not the previous owners or occupiers of the land.

99.

See ROBERT MEGARRY & M. THOMPSON, MEGARRY'S MANUAL OF THE LAW OF REAL

PROPERTY 308 (1993). Though authorities such as Megarry suggest that the absence of rent is
not fatal to a lessor-lessee relationship, I would contend that its presence is a defining feature
of such a relationship.
100. See Minerals and Mining Law, § 71. Since the minerals in their raw state are vested
in the State, it has the right to receive the royalties that are paid in respect of the minerals and
not the land. The government, however, has conceded to the request for payment of royalties
to the traditional leaders. See PEOPLES DAILY GRAPHIC, Aug. 31,1993, at 1.The legal basis for
the payment of royalties to the Chiefs is not certain. It is also not clear why the law provides

for the payment of rents "and other payments" to the State. See Minerals and Mining Law, §§
24,25(1).

101.

Minerals and Mining Law, § 70.
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The law also provides that the rights conferred by the mineral right shall
be exercised in a manner consistent with the reasonable and proper
conduct of the mining operations so as to affect as little as possible the
interest of any lawful occupier of the land. 2 The interests of the lawful
occupier include the right to graze livestock upon the land, hunt game,
gather firewood for domestic purposes, observe rites in respect of groves
and other sacred areas, and to cultivate the surface of the land subject to the
mineral right, in so far as such rights do not interfere with the mineral
operations in the area. Additionally, the original owner or lawful occupier
of the land in the mining area can erect any building or structure, but may
do so only with the consent of the holder of the mining lease. If the mineral
right holder unreasonably withholds such consent, the Minister's consent
could be sought." a
The foregoing provisions demonstrate quite clearly that the
government is the head lessor and apparently both the mineral right holder
and the "lawful occupier" hold their rights at the sufferance of the
government. Support for this conclusion is drawn from clause 1 of the
Sample Mining lease which reads, "The government hereby grantsto the
company mining rights to ALL that piece of land described in the schedule
hereto.., together with mines, beds, seams, veins, channels, strata of gold
and other associated mineral substances." It is the government that grants
the lease and determines the incidents of the lease. Moreover, it is the
government that determines what a "lawful occupier" may or may not do
on land that has mineral rights granted to a third party. Even where some
rights are reserved for the "lawful occupier," such rights are secondary to
the mineral operations and largely determined by the government.' 4 It
appears that the owner or occupier of the land whose mineral rights have
been leased may lose all his or her rights to the land by the payment of
compensation by the mining company at the insistence of the government.
Such compensation makes up for any disturbance of the rights of a land
owner and for any damage done to the surface of the land, buildings,
works, livestock, crops, trees et cetera, in the area of the mineral operations.1 s
Another indication of the assumption of state control over the land
subject to the mineral right is the fact that all rents, royalties and other
payments in respect to the use of the land for mining purposes by the

102. See id.
103. See id. §§ 70(3), (4). See also MINERALS COMMISSION, SAMPLE PROSPECrING LICENSE CIS.
2(d), 3(b) & SAMPLE MINING LEASE c. l(e) (on file with the University of Ghana Law Library).
104. See Minerals and Mining Law, §§ 70(1), (3), (4).
105. See id; SAMPLE PROSPECTING LICENSE, supra note 103.
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company are to be paid to the government.'" Section 25(1) of the Minerals
and Mining Law states that "royalties, fees, rents or other payments which
fall due in respect of any mineral right or otherwise under the provisions
of this law shall be a [debt] due to the Republic." 1' If all the attributes of
ownership of the mining land are given to the government then it is not
unreasonable to conclude that the lawful occupier of the land could not
maintain an action for environmental damage merely because he owned
that land. The state could initiate an action for environmental damage to
the mining land, especially when such damage affects its reversionary
interest. The state may also take action if such damage is interpreted as
violating the terms of the mining lease.
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that compared to the
customary owner of land, the state, under the legislation discussed, has
become the owner of minerals. As a consequence, the state arrogates to
itself the right, over and above that of landowner, to grant mining rights in
any such land. The state's superior right and interest over such land is
confirmed by the fact that it is entitled to rent and royalties from the mining
activity. It also controls the activities on mining land and defines the rights
of customary landowners in the lands leased for mining. Therefore, the
state has standing to sue where mining interests cause damage to the
environment Although the landowner is not explicitly usurped of rights
of ownership and standing to sue by the state's right to lease his land to
mining interests, his capacity to sue where the mining activity affects his
interests in lands acquired or leased by the state is uncertain.
Ghana is currently experiencing what has been described as
another gold rush and a boom in mining generally. Since 1986 over sixty

mining companies have been granted licenses to mine for precious

minerals, particularly gold."° Many of the new mines are surface mines,

106. Section 24 of the Minerals and Mining Law provides for the payment of all rental
charges to be prescribed by regulations, but does not say to whom it is to be paid. See also
SAMPLE MINING LEASE, supra note 103, at d. 2.

107. The Administration of Lands Act has a similar provision in section 17. The two
provisions appear to be in conflict with Article 267 of the Constitution, which provides for the
establishment of a Stool Account for each stool into which all rents, dues, royalties and other
payments from the Stool lands are to be paid. The collection of all such revenues and
payments are to be made by the Administrator of Stool lands appointed under the
Constitution. It must be noted that almost all the mining areas are under the jurisdiction of
various stools.
108. See Proceedings of the Mining Seminar, supra note 4.
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necessitating the re-location of settlements and towns."° The need for
explicit legal provisions defining ownership of land in Ghana has become
more urgent. To avoid the real possibility of instability in the mining sector
resulting from land disputes, it is necessary that rights of ownership and
use of land be made unequivocal. Once the rights of landowners are
defined, the capacity to pursue an action for the environmental damage
caused by mining activities would, hopefully, be made more precise.

109. See Adwoa Van Ess, The Mines, OurHeritage,PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC, Apr. 8,1998.
See also Ahinful Mensah, Fear,PanicGrip Tarkwa and Its Environs, INDEPENDENT, May 28,1998,
at 1; Ekow Yamoah, Farming Communities Vow To Resist Mining Companies, GHANAIAN
CHRONICLE, June 10 & 11, 1998, at 3.

